We introduce a formal model for certificateless authenticated key exchange (CL-AKE) protocols. Contrary to what might be expected, we show that the natural combination of an ID-based AKE protocol with a public key based AKE protocol cannot provide strong security. We provide the first one-round CL-AKE scheme proven secure in the random oracle model. We introduce two variants of the Diffie-Hellman trapdoor introduced by [CKS08] . The proposed key agreement scheme is secure as long as each party has at least one uncompromised secret. Thus, our scheme is secure even if the key generation centre learns the ephemeral secrets of both parties.
By combining an ID-based scheme with a public key based scheme, certificateless encryption [YL04a] , [LQ06] , certificateless signatures [YL04b] , and certificateless key encapsulation mechanisms [BFMLS08] can be readily constructed from existing protocols. Contrary to what would be expected, we show that a certificateless key agreement protocol cannot be securely constructed by a natural combination of an ID-based key agreement protocol with a public key based key agreement protocol.
The security model is an extension of Swanson's [Swa08] modified version of the extended Canetti and Krawczyk model presented in [LLM07] for certificateless key agreement. In this paper, we strengthen the model further (thus giving more power to the adversary) and provide the first formal proof for a strongly secure certificateless key agreement scheme in the random oracle model. Moreover, the protocol we propose is a one round protocol that withstands all of Swanson's attacks, although the messages exchanged in our protocol are exactly the same messages as in Mandt and Tan's protocol [MT06] . To withstand the attacks we use a modified version of the technique presented by Xia et al. [XWSX08] .
We prove that our certificateless key agreement protocol is secure even if the key generation centre actively tries to break the scheme: it may either reveal ephemeral secrets or reveal secret values / replace public keys but not both. In fact, we show that as long as each party still has at least one uncompromised secret, our scheme is still secure in the random oracle model assuming that the computational DiffieHellman assumption and the computational bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption hold. Our proofs are in the strongest security model available for certificateless schemes, i.e. it corresponds to Dent's [Den08] Strong Type I and Strong Type II security where the adversary is allowed to replace certificateless public keys and the challenger still has to answer all oracle queries.
The main contributions of this paper are:
• Strongest formal model for secure authenticated certificateless key exchange protocols today. We provide the equivalent of a strong decryption oracle [Den08] for reveal queries.
• An analysis of why certificateless key establishment schemes (CL-AKE) cannot be readily composed by combining an ID-based authenticated key establishment (ID-AKE) scheme with a public key authenticated key establishment (PK-AKE) scheme in our security model.
• First one-round protocol for certificateless key agreement with a security proof in the random oracle model that fulfills all notions of security of our model and withstands recent attacks on certificateless key agreement protocols.
The organization of the paper is as follows: we introduce the security model in Section 2 and relate it to existing notions of security for key agreement schemes and certificateless encryption. We also show why a generic composition of ID-AKE with PK-AKE does not have sufficient security guarantees in our model. A description of the scheme is given in Section 3 on page 6. Section 5 on page 10 discusses the security proof of the new protocol. We conclude our paper by answering some open questions in Section 6 on page 18.
Security model for certificateless key agreement schemes
The following security properties are commonly required of key establishment protocols in general.
Resistance to basic impersonation attacks. An adversary who does not know the private key of party A should not be able to impersonate A.
Resistance to Unknown Key-Share (UKS) attacks. An adversary M interferes with two honest parties A and B such that both parties accept the session and compute the same key. However, while A thinks that the key is shared with B, B is convinced that the key is shared with M.
Known key security. Each run of a key agreement protocol between two parties A and B should produce a unique session key. A protocol should not become insecure if the adversary has learned some of the session keys [LMQ + 03].
Weak Perfect Forward Secrecy (wPFS). A key-exchange protocol provides weak PFS (wPFS)
if an attacker M cannot distinguish from random a key of any session for which the session and its matching session are clean 1 even if M has learned the private keys of both peers to the session [ Kra05, Definition 22 ].
Resistance to Key-Compromise Impersonation (KCI) attacks. We say that a KE-attacker M that has learned the private key of partyÂ succeeds in a Key-compromise impersonation (KCI) attack againstÂ if M is able to distinguish from random the session key of a complete session at A for which the session peer is uncorrupted and the session and its matching session (if it exists) are clean [Kra05, Definition 20] .
Resistance to disclosure of ephemeral secrets. The protocol should be resistant to the disclosure of ephemeral secrets. The disclosure of an ephemeral secret should not compromise the security of sessions where the ephemeral secret was not used.
ID-based protocols usually require the following property in addition to these properties:
KGC forward secrecy The key generation centre (KGC) should be unable to compute the session key knowing all publicly available information.
For certificateless protocols, we will additionally require the following property. Mandt & Tan [MT06] call this property "Resistance to known session-specific temporary information", but they provide only an informal definition. It is not possible to provide this property in an ID-based key agreement scheme since a KGC who knows the ephemeral secrets has all inputs to the session key.
Resistance to leakage of ephemeral secrets to the KGC. If a malicious KGC learns the ephemeral secrets of any session, the KGC should not be able to compute the session key.
Formal definition of the security model
We present a strengthened version of Swanson's [Swa08] model, which in turn is based on LaMacchia, Lauter & Mityagin's [LLM07] extended Canetti-Krawczyk (eCK) model. We discuss the changes to the respective models in Section 2.2 on page 5. Let U = {U 1 , . . . U n } be a set of parties. The protocol may be run between any two of these parties. For each party there exists an identity based public key that can be derived from its identifier. There is a key generation centre that issues identity based private keys to the parties through a secure channel. Additionally, the parties generate their own secret values and certificateless public keys.
The adversary is in control of the network over which protocol messages are exchanged. Π t i,j represents the t th protocol session which runs at party i with intended partner party j. Additionally, the adversary is allowed to replace certificateless public keys that are used to compute the session key. The adversary does not have to disclose the private key matching the replaced certificateless public key to the respective party.
A session Π t i,j enters an accepted state when it computes a session key SK t i,j . Note that a session may terminate without ever entering into an accepted state. The information of whether a session has terminated with acceptance or without acceptance is assumed to be public. The session Π t i,j is assigned a partner ID pid = (ID i , ID j ). The session ID sid of Π t i,j at party i is the transcript of the messages exchanged with party j during the session. Two sessions Π t i,j and Π u j,i are considered matching if they have the same pid (and sid).
The game runs in two phases. During the first phase of the game, the adversary M is allowed to issue the following queries in any order:
: If the session Π t i,j does not exist, it will be created as initiator at party i if x = λ, or as a responder at party j otherwise. If the participating parties have not been initiated before, the respective private and public keys are created. Upon receiving the message x, the protocol is executed. After party i has sent and received the last set of messages specified by the protocol, it outputs a decision indicating accepting or rejecting the session. In the case of one-round protocols, party i behaves as follows: x = λ: Party i generates an ephemeral value and responds with an outgoing message only.
1 Roughly speaking clean is the same as fresh in Definition 1 on the following page. x = λ: If party i is a responder, it generates an ephemeral value for the session and responds with an outgoing message m and a decision indicating acceptance or rejection of the session. If party i as an initiator, it responds with a decision indicating accepting or rejecting the session.
In this work, we require i = j, i.e. a party will not run a session with itself.
Reveal master key The adversary is given access to the master secret key.
Session key reveal(Π t i,j ): If the session has not accepted, it returns ⊥, otherwise it reveals the accepted session key.
Reveal ID-based secret(i): Party i responds with its ID-based private key, e.g. sH 1 (ID i ).
Reveal secret value(i): Party i responds with its secret value x i that corresponds to its certificateless public key. If i has been asked the replace public key query before, it responds with ⊥.
Replace public key(i, pk): Party i's certificateless public key is replaced with pk chosen by the adversary. Party i will use the new public key for all communication and computation.
Reveal ephemeral key(Π t i,j ): Party i responds with the ephemeral secret used in session Π t i,j
We can group the key reveal queries into three types: the reveal master key and reveal ID-based secret queries try to undermine the security of the ID-based part of the scheme, the reveal secret value and replace public key queries try to undermine the security of the public key based part of the scheme, and the reveal ephemeral key query tries to undermine the security of one particular session. We define the state fully corrupt as a session that was asked all three types of reveal queries: the reveal master key or reveal ID-based secret, the reveal secret value or the replace public key, and the reveal ephemeral key query.
Once the adversary M decides that the first phase is over, it starts the second phase by choosing a fresh session Π After the test(Π t i,j ) query has been issued, the adversary can continue querying except that the test session Π t i,j should remain fresh. We emphasize here that partial corruption is allowed as this is a benefit of our security model. Additionally, replace public key queries may be issued to any party after the test session has been completed.
At the end of the game, the adversary outputs a guessb for b. Ifb = b, we say that the adversary wins. The adversary's advantage in winning the game is defined as
Definition 2 (Strong Type I secure key agreement scheme). A certificateless key agreement scheme is Strong Type I secure if every probabilistic, polynomial-time adversary M has negligible advantage in winning the game described in Section 2.1 on the preceding page subject to the following constraints:
• M may corrupt at most two out of three types of secrets per party involved in the test session,
• M is allowed to replace public keys of any party; however, this counts as the corruption of one secret,
• M may not reveal the secret value of any identity for which it has replaced the certificateless public key,
• M is allowed to ask session key reveal queries even for session keys computed by identities where M replaced the identity's public key.
• M is allowed to replace public keys of any party after the test query has been issued.
Definition 3 (Strong Type II secure key agreement scheme). A certificateless key agreement scheme is Strong Type II secure if every probabilistic, polynomial-time adversary M has negligible advantage in winning the game described in Section 2.1 on page 3 subject to the following constraints:
• M is given the master secret key s at the start of the game,
• M may corrupt at most one additional type of secret per party participating in the test query,
• M is allowed to ask session key reveal queries even for session keys computed by identities where he replaced the identity's public key.
Relation to existing notions of security
Swanson's [Swa08] replace public key query is weaker in assuming that the party whose key was replaced continues to make its computations with its original (unreplaced) public key (and its matching private key). Although it seems that Swanson's model is more "natural" than our model, strong certificateless encryption has been the goal of many papers, a discussion of the benefits and drawbacks can be found in [DLP08] . As it gives more power to the adversary, we think that schemes that are strongly secure are preferable to those in a weaker security model. When checking for a matching conversation, Swanson omits the certificateless public keys from the conversation transcript. This weakens the adversary compared to our model, as the adversary would not be allowed to replace public keys and try to replay the conversation with the replaced keys of the test query after the test query has been issued.
With respect to LaMacchia et al. [LLM07] , the main difference of our definition is that instead of having only four pieces of secret information, in certificateless protocols there are six: the ID-based secret keys, the user's secret value, and the ephemeral private keys of both parties. We require a certificateless AKE to be secure as long as each party still holds at least one uncompromised secret.
We note that as the challenger has to answer session key reveal queries even for keys where the respective certificateless public keys have been replaced, the adversary has access to the equivalent of a "Strong Decrypt" oracle in certificateless encryption. Strong decryption oracles were first introduced by Al-Riyami and Paterson [ARP03] . Dent [Den08] defines the Strong Decryption Oracle as follows.
Definition 4 (Strong Decryption Oracle). The adversary supplies an identity ID and a ciphertext C, and the challenger responds with the decryption of C under the private key sk ID . Note that if the attacker has replaced the public key for ID, then this oracle should return the correct decryption of C using the private key that inverts the public key pk ID currently associated with the identity ID (or ⊥ if no such private key exists).
A strong decryption oracle in public key cryptography is able to return the plaintext for a given ciphertext (which does not necessarily mean that the plaintext has been decrypted using the correct key, as with double encryption). We note that in a session key reveal query the correct key for a given session has to be revealed, which is a stronger requirement. The scheme in Section 3 on the following page is both Strong Type I and Strong Type II secure with respect to Dent's definitions.
In the security proof in Section 5 on page 10 and Section 5.4 on page 14 we do not differentiate between these two types of adversarial behaviour but treat them together. If the adversary was split to be either Strong Type I or Strong Type II, then a Strong Type II adversary would be applicable only for the Strategies 1, 2, 3, and 4 in Section 5.1 on page 11. Being able to distinguish between Type I and Type II adversaries would thus increase the probability of success for the challenger.
Why a natural composition of CL-AKE from ID-AKE and PK-AKE is not possible in our model
In the security model, a session can only be fresh as long as each party still has at least one uncompromised secret. A composition of an ID-AKE with a PK-AKE is depicted in Figure 1 . A natural way to achieve such a composition consists of running the two protocols in parallel and deriving the session key of the overall composition as a publicly known function of solely the two component session keys. This composition cannot offer the desired level of security, because no security guarantees exist if party A still has an uncompromised key in the PK-AKE and party B still has an uncompromised key in the ID-AKE (both AKE schemes are broken at this moment). This may explain why no CL-AKE schemes with a proof of security have been published before. 
The lines indicate what combination of secrets gives resistance against which attack type. Examples for public key schemes applicable to this diagram would be NAXOS [LLM07] and CMQV [Ust08] , an example for an ID-based scheme would be the ASIACCS09 [HC08] scheme. However, a combination of these schemes would not have any security guarantees about the dashed lines in the certificateless part of the diagram. We describe the phases of our certificateless authenticated key exchange protocol in this section. Our protocol consists of three phases: setup, message exchange and key computation. We also briefly address the efficiency of the proposed protocol.
Setup
• The KGC publishes a generator P ∈ G and an admissible bilinear pairings map e : G × G → G T that fulfills the following criteria:
Let G and G T be groups of prime order p. A bilinear pairings map e : G × G → G T between the groups G and G T satisfies the following properties:
Bilinear We say that a map e : G × G → G T is bilinear if e(aP, bP ) = e(P, P ) ab for all P ∈ G and a, b ∈ Z p .
Non-degenerate We say that e is non-degenerate if it does not send all pairs in G×G to the identity in G T . Since G and G T are groups of prime order p, it follows that if P ∈ G is a generator of G, then e(P, P ) is a generator of G T .
Computable There is an efficient algorithm to compute e(P, Q) for any P, Q ∈ G.
Suitable pairing groups for this protocol would be Type 1 and Type 4 pairings (see Chen, Cheng & Smart [CCS07] for a discussion). Asymmetric pairings are not possible because we use the noninteractive ID-based key agreement of Sakai, Ohgishi and Kasahara (SOK) [SOK00] as part of our protocol. This requires hashing to both G 1 and G 2 . The SOK protocol has been proven by Dupont and Enge [DE02] using gap assumptions. As an added benefit of our proof, we show how to prove the SOK protocol secure under the weaker computational bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption using the twin bilinear Diffie-Hellman trapdoor [CKS08] in section 5.4 on page 14, Strategy 9.
• The KGC picks a random s ∈ Z p as master secret key and sets its public key to sP
• The KGC selects three cryptographic hash functions
n for some integer n > 0
H 2 is the key derivation function for our scheme.
Each party participating in the key agreement protocol additionally computes a private key and a matching certificateless public key:
• Each user U generates a secret value x U $ ← Z p and a public key x U P ∈ G
• Each user U gets an ID-based private key {sH 1 (ID U ), sH 3 (H 1 (ID U ))} ∈ G 2 from the key generation centre.
Message exchange
To establish a common key, user A generates the ephemeral secret r A $ ← Z p and user B generates the ephemeral secret r B $ ← Z p . They exchange the following messages:
We note that the certificateless public keys can be stripped from the messages if they are published in a public online directory. This will save bandwidth, but at the same time may make the scheme more vulnerable to the equivalent of denial of decryption attacks in certificateless encryption: an adversary may manipulate the entries of the directory more easily than the message exchange between two parties. As we propose a one-round protocol, our protocol achieves only implicit authentication. Krawczyk [Kra05, Section 8] shows that explicit authentication is possible with three half rounds. To achieve explicit authentication, this protocol can be patched in the same way that HMQV is patched to HMQV-C.
In the following we require implicitly that each party always checks subgroup membership for all elements of messages that are exchanged in the protocol to defend against small subgroup attacks [LL97].
Key computation
To compute the certificateless session key, each user computes
In Section 5 on page 10 and Section 5.4 on page 14 the challenger B uses the adversary M to solve either the computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) or the computational bilinear Diffie-Hellman (CBDH) problem. K, L, and N are used in the proof to embed the input to the CBDH challenge into the test session. Each of these values is necessary to defend against one possible attack strategy of the adversary M. K is the product of two encapsulated Boneh-Franklin session keys, L is similar but with certificateless long-term keys. N is the non-interactive ID-based key agreement scheme proposed by [SOK00] . K , L , and N are needed to answer reveal queries of the adversary M consistently. To answer reveal queries, the challenger B makes use of the twin bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem as introduced by Cash, Kiltz and Shoup [CKS08] . The twin bilinear Diffie-Hellman "backdoor" is embedded in K , L and N .
Efficiency considerations
Although the protocol is one round, the computational overhead imposed on the parties is rather high: each party has to compute 5 exponentiations in G and 10 pairings. We would like to note that we need the H 3 hash function in the proof for full computational bilinear Diffie-Hellman security. If the gap bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption is used (see Kudla and Paterson [KP05] for gap assumptions), the H 3 hash function can be omitted which saves 2 hash queries and reduces the complexity of the protocol to 3 exponentiations in G and 5 pairing computations (as K , L , and N do not have to be computed).
If there are multiple runs of the protocol between the same users (e.g. for rekeying in VPN's), then the complexity can be reduced by caching x A x B P , L, L , N , and N in secure memory which then reduces the complexity for successive runs to 4 exponentiations and 4 pairing computations (or 2 exponentiations and 2 pairing computations if the gap bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption is used). It may be possible to do better in terms of computational efficiency. However, the aim of this paper is to provide a strong model for certificateless key agreement and to show that schemes corresponding to the model exist.
We introduce the theorems that we later use as decisional oracles to be able to answer the H 2 queries of the adversary consistently (and to determine when the adversary submits the solution to a hard problem to the H 2 oracle). We continue then by embedding a hard problem in each of the uncorrupted secrets that are available in the respective strategies.
The Twin Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Trapdoor Theorems
The proof in section 5.4 on page 14 for Strategy 5 to 8 relies heavily on the following theorem:
Theorem 1 (Trapdoor Test). Let e : G × G → G T be a bilinear pairing, where G, G T are two cyclic groups of prime order p. Let P ∈ G be a generator of G. Suppose B 1 ∈ G, y, z ∈ Z p are mutually independent random variables. Define B 2 := yP − zB 1 . Further, suppose that A, C are random variables in G and T 1 , T 2 are random variables in G T , each of which is defined as some function of B 1 and B 2 . Then we have:
1. B 2 is uniformly distributed over G.
2. B 1 and B 2 are independent.
3. If B 1 = b 1 P and B 2 = b 2 P , then the probability that the truth value of
does not agree with the truth value of
is at most 1/p, moreover, if Equation 2 holds, then Equation 1 certainly holds.
See [CKS08] , [HC08] for an explanation and a proof. Additionally we need the "Additive double BDH Trapdoor Test" and the "Multiplicative double BDH Trapdoor Test" for Strategy 9:
Theorem 2 (Additive double BDH Trapdoor Test). Let e : G × G → G T be a bilinear pairing, where G, G T are two cyclic groups of prime order p. Let P ∈ G be a generator of G. Suppose B 1 , D 1 ∈ G, y 1 , y 2 , z ∈ Z p are mutually independent random variables. Define B 2 := y 1 P − zB 1 and D 2 := y 2 P − zD 1 . Further, suppose that A, C are random variables in G and T 1 , T 2 are random variables in G T , each of which is defined as some function of (A, C, B 1 , D 1 ) and (A, C, B 2 , D 2 ). Then we have:
(ii) B 1 and B 2 are independent and D 1 and D 2 are independent and B 2 and D 2 are independent, and B 1 + D 1 and B 2 + D 2 are independent (also due to y 1 and y 2 ).
, then the probability that the truth value of
is
Proof. This proof is a rewrite of Cash, Kiltz and Shoup's [CKS08] trapdoor test proof. Observe that
It is easy to verify that B 2 + D 2 is uniformly distributed over G, and that B 1 + D 1 , B 2 + D 2 , z are mutually independent, from which (i) and (ii) follow. To prove (iii), condition on fixed values of B 1 + D 1 and B 2 + D 2 . In the resulting conditional probability space, z is uniformly distributed over Z p , while ( 
It is not hard to see that if T 1 = e(A, C) b1+d1 and T 2 = e(A, C) b2+d2 , then Equation 5 certainly does not hold. This leaves us with the case T 1 = e(A, C) b1+d1 . But in this case, the left hand side of Equation 5 is a random element of G T (since z is uniformly distributed in Z p ), but the right hand side is a fixed element of G T . Thus, Equation 5 holds with probability 1/p in this case.
Theorem 3 (Multiplicative double BDH Trapdoor Test).
2 Let e : G × G → G T be a bilinear pairing, where G, G T are two cyclic groups of prime order p. Let P ∈ G be a generator of G. Suppose B 1 , C 1 ∈ G, y 1 , y 2 , z ∈ Z p are mutually independent random variables. Define B 2 := y 1 P − zB 1 and C 2 := y 2 P − zC 1 . Further, suppose that A is a random variables in G and T 1 , T 2 are random variables in G T , each of which is defined as some function of (A, B 1 , C 1 ) and (A, B 2 , C 2 ). Then we have:
(i) B 2 and C 2 are uniformly distributed over G (guaranteed by y 1 and y 2 ), and e(B 2 , C 2 ) is uniformly distributed over G T .
(ii) B 1 and B 2 are independent and C 1 and C 2 are independent and B 2 and C 2 are independent, and e(B 1 , C 1 ) and e(B 2 , C 2 ) are independent (also due to y 1 and y 2 ).
(iii) If B 1 = b 1 P, B 2 = b 2 P, C 1 = c 1 P, C 2 = c 2 P , then the probability that the truth value of
is at most 2/p, moreover, if Equation 7 holds, then Equation 6 certainly holds.
2 If this test was implemented with B 2 = y 1 P − z 1 bP and C 2 = y 2 P − z 2 cP , then the probability that Equation 7 holds would be 1 p 2 . We use z instead of z 1 and z 2 because we need Theorem 2 simultaneously.
Proof. Observe that y 1 y 2 = (zb 1 + b 2 )(zc 1 + c 2 ) = z 2 b 1 c 1 + zb 1 c 2 + zb 2 c 1 + b 2 c 2 . It is easy to verify that e(B 2 , C 2 ) is uniformly distributed over G T , and that e(B 1 , C 1 ), e(B 2 , C 2 ), z are mutually independent, from which (i) and (ii) follow. To prove (iii), condition on fixed values of e(B 1 , C 1 ) and e(B 2 , C 2 ). In the resulting conditional probability space, z is uniformly distributed over Z p , while b 1 c 1 , b 2 c 2 , A, T 1 and T 2 are fixed. If Equation 7 on the preceding page holds, then by multiplying together the two equations in Equation 7 on the previous page, we see that Equation 6 on the preceding page certainly holds. Conversely, if Equation 7 on the previous page does not hold, we show that Equation 6 on the preceding page holds with probability at most 2/p. Observe that Equation 6 on the previous page is equivalent to
It is not hard to see that if T 1 = e(A, P ) b1c1 and T 2 = e(A, P ) b2c2 , then Equation 8 certainly does not hold. This leaves us with the case T 1 = e(A, P ) b1c1 . But in this case, the left hand side of Equation 8 is the square of a random element of G T . Since z is uniformly distributed in Z p , z 2 is uniformly distributed over half of Z p as half of the elements of Z p are quadratic residues. On the other hand, the right hand side of 8 is a fixed element of G T . Thus, Equation 8 holds with probability 2/p in this case.
Security proof for the certificateless key agreement scheme
We will prove that the certificateless key agreement scheme is a secure key agreement scheme in the random oracle model under the computational bilinear Diffie-Hellman (CBDH) assumption and the computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption. The CBDH the assumption states that given {aP, bP, cP } ∈ G 3 it is hard to compute e(P, P ) abc ∈ G T . Let Z be an algorithm that takes as input a triple {aP, bP, cP } ∈ G 3 , and outputs an element Z ∈ G T . We define the CBDH advantage of Z to be
The CDH assumption states that given {aP, bP } ∈ G 2 it is hard to compute abP ∈ G. Let Z be an algorithm that takes as input the pair {aP, bP } ∈ G 2 , and outputs an element T ∈ G. We define the CDH advantage of Z to be Pr a, b
To relate the advantage of an adversary against our protocol to the above assumptions, we use a classical reduction approach. We assume that an adversary M has an advantage in winning the game outlined in Section 2.1 on page 3. Additionally, the adversary M may query the random oracles H 1 , H 2 , and H 3 . In the following, the challenger B is interested to use the adversary M to turn M's advantage in distinguishing a random session key from the correct session key in an advantage to solve either the computational Diffie-Hellman problem or the computational bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem. Let q 0 be the maximum number of sessions that any one party may have. We assume that the adversary M makes at most q 1 distinctive H 1 queries. The adversary may make any number of H 2 queries or H 3 queries. At the end of the game, M outputs its guessb ∈ {0, 1} for b. Let Adv M (k)[Π] be the advantage that the adversary M has against the protocol, i.e. the event thatb = b and M wins the game. , the challenger B can use this adversary to solve either the computational DiffieHellman or the computational bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem. We show that the success probability of any adversary against the scheme is limited by
where Adv B (k)[CDH] is the advantage that the challenger gets in solving the computational DiffieHellman problem given security parameter k using the adversary and Adv B (k)[CBDH] is the advantage that the challenger gets in solving the computational bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem given security parameter k using the adversary. x I x J P r I r J P r I x J P/r J x I P K L N Problem type CDH CDH CDH CBDH CBDH CBDH c = corrupt, r = replace, mirr. = swap columns I and J Strategy 1 -4 are related to the computational Diffie-Hellman problem, Strategies 5 -9 are related to the computational bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem. In the proof, the problem is always embedded in the values that the adversary may not corrupt or replace. We note that the CBDH problem is strictly weaker than the CDH problem. Thus, an adversary that is able to solve the CDH problem will also be able to solve the CBDH problem. We differentiate between these two problems because security against a Type II adversary is based solely on the CDH problem, whereas security against a Type I adversary is based on both the CDH problem and the CBDH problem.
Possible strategies for the challenger
Before the game starts, the challenger B tries to guess the test session. To this end, B randomly selects two indexes I, J ∈ {1, . . . , q 1 } : I = J that represent the I th and the J th distinct query to the H 1 oracle. The probability that B chooses I and J correctly is (as there are at most q 1 entries in
B chooses T ∈ {1, . . . , q 0 } and thus determines the test oracle Π T I,J , which is correct with probability larger than 1 q0q 2
1
. If B did not guess the test session correctly, B aborts the game. In order to use the adversary M to gain an advantage in computing the CBDH or the CDH challenge, the challenger B will guess the parts of the key in the session corresponding to the test query that the adversary may not learn. Depending on the chosen strategy, B aborts the game whenever M's queries target one of the forbidden elements. Otherwise, the game proceeds as usual. There are nine choices for B (see also 6. The adversary may neither learn the secret value of ID I nor replace the secret value of ID I and may also not learn the ID-based private key of ID J .
7. The adversary may neither learn the ephemeral private key of ID J nor the ID-based private key of ID I .
8. The adversary may neither learn the ephemeral private key of ID I nor the ID-based private key of ID J .
ID H
Instead of choosing H 1 (ID i ) at random from G, B chooses l i ∈ Z p at random, records it, and sets H 1 (ID i ) to l i P . For Strategy 5, 7 and 9, the I th entry is set to H 1 (ID I ) = bP ; for Strategy 6 and 8, the J th entry is set to H 1 (ID J ) = bP . For Strategy 9 the J th entry is set to H 1 (ID J ) = cP . bP and cP are taken from the inputs to the BDH challenge. As bP and cP are random in G, this modification is indistinguishable for any adversary. The table above shows the H 1 oracle for Strategy 9 as an example. As there are nine strategies, the probability that B does not abort the game after B selected the strategy and the test session beforehand is now larger than 1 9q0q 2
1
. The adversary may learn the key generation centre's master secret only in Strategy 1,2,3, and 4. Furthermore, B replaces the H 2 oracle by a table which records input/output pairs. If a query is made that matches one of the previous inputs, the corresponding output is returned, otherwise, a value from the respective output domain is chosen at random, the new input/output pair is added to the list and the value is returned. The H 1 and H 3 oracle operate as explained in Table 2 and Table 3 on the next page respectively.
Relation to the security model
We gave a list of desirable notions of security in Section 2 on page 2 and would like to analyse the security of the protocol in relation to the strategies. We note that UKS attacks are not a problem as the key derivation function H 2 uses the identities of the parties as input and would output different keys in the event of an UKS attack. Furthermore, the identity-based public keys are derived from the identity's name and prevent UKS attacks, too. Basic impersonation attacks are not possible as it is necessary to know the private keys of a party to compute K, K , L, L , N and N which are inputs to the key derivation function H 2 . Weak perfect forward secrecy is guaranteed by the proof for Strategy 2. Resistance to key compromise impersonation attacks is also proved using Strategy 2. Resistance to (partial) disclosure of ephemeral secrets is proven in all strategies except Strategy 2, where Strategies 1, 3 and 9 are most important: Strategy 1 also provides security against leakage of ephemeral secrets to the key generation centre or an adversary who compromised both identity based private keys, Strategy 3 provides security against leakage of ephemeral secrets to an adversary who replaced the certificateless public key of one identity and corrupted the ID-based public key of the other identity, Strategy 9 provides security against leakage of ephemeral secrets to a adversary who replaces the certificateless public keys of both identities.
Behaviour of the challenger based on the chosen strategy
To solve the computational DH problem using M, B is given the values (aP, bP ) and B's task is to compute abP . To solve this problem, B uses the H 2 oracle. The bilinear pairing is used for consistency checks.
To solve the computational BDH problem using M, B is given the values (aP, bP, cP ) and B's task is to compute e(P, P ) abc . To solve this problem, B uses the H 2 and the H 1 oracle. The H 3 oracle is used for consistency checks and operates as in Table 3 on the next page.
The session key SK is generated by querying H 2 on (ID i , ID j , r i P, x i P, r j P, x j P, r i r j P, x i x j P,
Instead of choosing H 3 (g i ) for g i ∈ G at random from G, B chooses y i ∈ Z p at random, records it, and sets H 3 (g i ) to y i P . For Strategy 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9, the oracle is patched before the game starts by setting H 3 (bP ) = y tbdh1 P − zbP . For Strategy 9, the oracle is additionally patched before the game starts with H 3 (cP ) = y tbdh2 P − zcP . bP and cP are taken from the inputs to the BDH challenge. As the pre-patched values are completely re-randomized, this modification is indistinguishable for any adversary. The table above shows the H 3 oracle for Strategy 9 as an example. 
Depending on the chosen strategy, B embeds the challenge in the test query and answers the test query as specified in Section 2.1 on page 3.
Patching the H 2 oracle
B has to maintain consistency between the H 2 oracle and session key reveal queries, as B will not be able to compute all data necessary to query the H 2 oracle for a valid session key in some instances (e.g. if certificateless public keys have been replaced by the adversary). If B has been asked on the H 2 oracle first and is then later asked a matching session key reveal query, B is always able to answer these requests correctly (it uses its decisional oracles that are explained in the proofs for respective strategies, see Section 5.4 on the next page). However, if B is asked a session key reveal query for which no matching H 2 query exists yet, B proceeds as follows: B inserts all available data and all data that B is able to compute (see also section 5.3) into the H 2 oracle but may have to leave some fields (like K and K or L and L or N and N ) empty. B chooses a random value from H 2 's output domain as the session key and records that value together with the incomplete H 2 query data. For the following H 2 queries, B first checks if one of the incomplete entries of the H 2 oracle matches M's query data by using the respective decisional oracle(s). If that is the case, B records the complete information submitted by M and returns the H 2 entry. B additionally fills up all long term values that it can determine (even if it is not able to fill a H 2 entry completely). If B finds no matching entry, B simply generates a new H 2 entry as usual.
Handling a
Without loss of generality, we assume that i is the initiator of the session. Given party i that has incoming message (r Mj P, x Mj P ) (where M j indicates that the values may be adversarial controlled) and that thus accepts, the challenger knows at least the identity based private keys and the ephemeral private key of party i, i.e. the challenger knows sH 1 (ID i ), sH 3 (H 1 (ID i )) , r i . The adversary may have replaced the certificateless public key of party i with x Mi P . To obtain a session key, party i has to query the H 2 oracle with the session data (as explained in Section 3.3 on page 7) on the following elements:
Besides the public values i, j, r i P, x Mi P, r Mj P, x Mj P that are part of the H 2 query, the challenger acting as party i is able to compute the following values knowing its (possibly corrupted) private information sH 1 (ID i ), sH 3 (H 1 (ID i )), r i : r i r Mj P trivially, by computing r i (r Mj P ) r i x Mj P by computing r i (x M J P ) K due to the patched H 1 oracle (see Table 2 on page 12), the challenger knows log P H 1 (ID i ) = l i and log P H 1 (ID j ) = l j . Thus K can be computed as
K just like for K, the challenger knows log P H 3 (H 1 (ID i )) = y i and log P H 3 ( H 1 (ID j )) = y j (see Table 3 on the previous page). Thus K can be computed as
L Knowing l i and l j from the H 1 oracle computing L is easy:
L can be computed similarly, just like K above.
N and N are easy as the ID-based private keys are known.
The only missing values are x Mi x Mj P and x Mi r Mj P which cannot be computed by the challenger. However, as we point out in the proof for Strategy 1 in Section 5.4, the challenger is still able to answer session state reveal and H 2 queries consistently: If the challenger is asked a H 2 query first and then later asked a matching session state reveal query, the challenger can identify the corresponding H 2 entry by checking for all entries if e(x i P, x j P ) = e(x i x j P, P ) and if e(x Mi P, r Mj P ) = e(x Mi r Mj P ). If the challenger is asked a session state reveal query, but there is no matching H 2 entry, the challenger can create a new random value from the output domain of H 2 and assign it to the incomplete entry. The challenger checks the subsequent queries of the adversary to the H 2 oracle and is able to answer the queries correctly by using the pairing as above.
In the following, we will split the challenger's behaviour based on the strategy chosen in Section 5.1 on page 11. Additionally, we omit the indices t i,j with respect to key computations for specific sessions to increase readability. Usually it is evident for which particular session the computations are needed. For the proof we assume that the adversary M does not get an advantage in outputting its guessb for b unless M queries the H 2 oracle on the session key.
Proofs for Strategy 1 to 9

Strategy 1
The allowed corrupt queries for the adversary are listed in Table 1 on page 11. The challenger B wants to use the adversary M to solve the computational Diffie-Hellman problem. The input for B is (aP, bP ) ∈ G 2 and B's goal is to compute abP . To this end, B sets the certificateless public key of ID I to aP and the certificateless public key of ID J to bP . B uses the pairing to check whether the queries of the adversary to the H 2 oracle are valid: by computing e(aP, bP ) = e(abP, P ), B is able to identify valid queries. As soon as B finds such a query, B aborts the game and returns abP as solution of the CDH challenge. The probability that B is able to find a solution to the CDH challenge is
B is able to compute all other elements (x I x J P, K, K , L, L , N, N ) that are necessary for H 2 queries as the respective private values are under B's control. If M is a Type II adversary as explained in Section 2.1 on page 3, B gives s to M at the start of the game. We note that as B knows s, B is able to generate ID-based private keys for any identity; thus the game does not have to be changed for Type II adversaries. We note that M is allowed to replace the certificateless public key of ID I and/or ID J after the test query has been issued. If M replaces the certificateless public keys of other identities and asks reveal queries, B first uses the pairing to check for matching queries to the H 2 oracle. If no matching query is found, B first generates a random value v of the output domain of H 2 , inserts the available session data together with v into the H 2 table as described in Section 5.2.1 on page 13 (i.e. everything including the certificateless public keys; except x i x j P which B cannot compute) and returns v. If B is then later asked H 2 queries containing the correct x i x j P and the certificateless keys x i P and x j P , B is able to tell so by using the pairing computation and completes the entries in the H 2 table wherever possible.
Strategy 2
The allowed corrupt queries for the adversary are listed in Table 1 on page 11. The challenger B wants to use the adversary M to solve the computational Diffie-Hellman problem. The input for B is (aP, bP ) ∈ G 2 and B's goal is to compute abP . To this end, B sets the ephemeral key of ID I to aP and the ephemeral key of ID J to bP in the test query. B uses the pairing to check whether the queries of the adversary to the H 2 oracle are valid: by computing e(aP, bP ) = e(abP, P ), B is able to identify valid queries. As soon as B find such a query, B aborts the game and returns abP as solution of the CDH challenge.
The probability that B is able to find a solution to the CDH challenge is
As M is allowed to replace the certificateless public keys of any identity, B uses the technique described in Strategy 1 to decide how to answer reveal queries and H 2 queries.
Strategy 3 and 4
The allowed corrupt queries for the adversary are listed in Table 1 on page 11. For Strategy 3, we want to embed the CDH challenge in r I x J P , because the input to other values used in the key derivation function can be corrupted by the adversary. Here, B selects the master private key s $ ← Z p . B is able to provide ID-based secret keys for all identities, as B is in possession of the master secret key. Furthermore, B sets the certificateless public key of ID I to x I P = aP and the ephemeral public key of party ID J to r J P = bP in session Π T I,J . If the adversary is a Type II adversary as described in Section 2.1 on page 3, then B gives s to M at the start of the game.
Similar to Strategy 1 and 2, B checks the H 2 queries for entries where e(P, r J x I P ) ? = e(aP, bP )
As soon as B finds such an entry, B aborts the game and returns r J x I P as solution to the BDH challenge. The probability that this happens is lower bounded by
9q 0 q 2 1 B uses the techniques described in Strategy 1 to deal with replaced certificateless keys of identities other than ID I . We note that M is allowed to replace the certificateless public key of ID I after the test query has been issued. We note that as Strategy 4 is symmetric to Strategy 3, its probability of success is equal to the probability of success for Strategy 3. Only ID I and ID J are exchanged and the computational BDH challenge is embedded in r I x J P instead of r J x I P .
Strategy 5 and 6
The allowed corrupt queries for Strategy 5 for the adversary are listed in Table 1 on page 11. The BDH challenge can only be embedded in L 2 if Strategy 5 is chosen, because the input to all other values used in the key derivation function can be corrupted by the adversary. To accomplish this, the challenger B sets the master public key to aP and implements the H 1 oracle as described in Table 2 on page 12, thus H 1 (ID I ) = bP . B patches the H 3 oracle as described in Table 3 on page 13, thus H 3 (H 1 (ID I )) = H 3 (bP ) = y tbdh1 P − zbP . B can still generate private keys for all identities except ID I by computing sH(ID i ) = l i aP and sH 3 (H 1 (ID i )) = y i aP . Additionally, B sets the certificateless public key of ID J to cP .
A problem for B arises when the adversary asks session key reveal queries for other sessions than the test session that include ID I and ID J , or for sessions that include ID I and another party for which the adversary issued a replace public key query. Whenever B is asked a reveal query, B first checks if the key derivation function H 2 was asked with a matching session string involving both ID I and ID J . As B is unable to compute L, B uses the twin bilinear Diffie-Hellman trapdoor (see Theorem 1 on page 8) to check if M submitted a valid query, i.e. if the query should be answered with a record from H 2 (if such a record exists). The challenger extracts the discrete logarithm for ID J 's private keys, l J and y J from the H 1 and H 3 oracle respectively (H 3 (H 1 (ID J )) = H 3 (l J P ) = y J P and B is able to extract both l J and y J ). Then, B extracts L and L from each entry that matches the session for which the reveal query is being asked, computes
acz1 · e(y tbdh1 P − zbP, P ) ac = e(P, P ) z1abc e(P, P ) y tbdh 1 ac−z1abc = e(P, P )
= e(aP, cP )
As soon as M submits such an entry to the H 2 oracle, B aborts the game and returns
= e(P, P ) abc as solution to the BDH challenge. B uses the same strategy for reveal queries to sessions of ID I where the adversary replaced the certificateless public key of ID j , except that B does not abort the game if a matching H 2 query is found but returns the correct H 2 value. If no matching H 2 query is found, B proceeds as in Section 5.2.1 on page 13. If the adversary replaces the certificateless public key of ID I , B additionally uses the strategy described in Strategy 1. We note that M is allowed to replace the certificateless public key of ID J after the test query has been issued. The probability that B is able to find a solution to the CBDH challenge is
Strategy 6 is symmetric to Strategy 5, so it has the same probability (only ID I and ID J are exchanged). The BDH challenge is embedded in L 1 instead of L 2 .
Strategy 7 and 8
The allowed corrupt queries for the adversary are listed in Table 1 on page 11. The BDH challenge can only be embedded in K 2 , because the input to all other values used in the key derivation function can be corrupted by the adversary. Using this strategy, the challenger sets the master public key sP to aP (notice that B does not know s). B changes the mode of operation of the H 1 oracle so that H 1 operates as in Table 2 on page 12, thus H 1 (ID I ) = bP . B patches the H 3 oracle as described in Table 3 on page 13, thus H 3 (H 1 (ID I )) = H 3 (bP ) = y tbdh1 P − zbP . B can still generate private keys for all identities except ID I by computing sH(ID i ) = l i aP and sH 3 (H 1 (ID i )) = y i aP . As queries for ID I 's private keys were ruled out, this does not affect the overall success probability. Additionally, B sets the ephemeral public key of party J = I that participates in the T th oracle Π T I,J to cP . If the adversary has an advantage in this strategy, then M needs to query the H 2 oracle on the session key. To distinguish this entry from other H 2 queries, B re-computes K 1 = e(aP, P ) l J r I and similarly the K 1 = e(aP, P ) y J r I . Then, B searches in the table of the H 2 oracle for an entry where
B aborts the game as soon as such an entry is submitted to the H 2 oracle and returns K/K 1 as solution to the computational bilinear Diffie-Hellman challenge. The probability that this happens is lower bounded by
A problem for B occurs if M replaces certificateless public keys. As B knows the ID-based private keys for all identities except ID I , B can compute K, K , L, L , N and N for any session except for sessions involving ID I . B may be unable to compute x i x j P if M replaced both x i P and x j P but can use the pairing as described in Strategy 1. For reveal queries involving ID I and replaced certificateless public keys, B uses the H 3 oracle as described in Strategy 5. Strategy 8 is symmetric to Strategy 7, so it has the same probability (only ID I and ID J are exchanged). The BDH challenge is embedded in K 1 instead of K 2 .
Strategy 9
The allowed corrupt queries for the adversary are listed in Table 1 on page 11. The BDH challenge will be embedded in N . To accomplish this, the challenger sets the master secret key to aP , H 1 (ID I ) = bP , and H 1 (ID J ) = cP . Additionally, the H 3 oracle (see Table 3 on page 13) is modified before the game starts so that H 3 (H 1 (ID I )) = H 3 (bP ) = y tbdh1 P − zbP and H 3 (H 1 (ID J )) = H 3 (cP ) = y tbdh2 P − zcP .
A problem for B arises when the adversary asks session key reveal queries for other sessions than the test session that include ID I and ID J , or for sessions where the adversary M replaces the certificateless public keys of any of the target identities. In these cases the challenger is unable to computer neither N nor L. Whenever B is asked a session key reveal query, B first checks if H 2 was asked with a matching session string involving both ID I and ID J . As B is generally unable to compute either L or N , B uses the trapdoor as explained in Theorem 3 on page 9 for N and Theorem 2 on page 9 for L to check if M submitted a valid query, i.e. if the query should be answered with a record from H 2 (if such a record exists). To this end, B extracts L, L , N and N from each entry that matches the session for which the reveal query is being asked, and checks if and if L z L = e(aP, cP ) y tbdh 1 +y tbdh 2 . If no matching record exists, B patches the H 2 oracle as explained in Section 5.2.1 on page 13. As soon as M submits such an entry to the H 2 oracle, B aborts the game and returns N as solution to the BDH challenge. The probability that this happens is lower bounded by
9q 0 q 2 1 B is able to distinguish between H 2 queries that have correct session data and H 2 queries that have invalid session data and is thus able to operate the H 2 oracle consistently. B may have to use the techniques explained in Strategy 1 and Strategy 5 to operate the H 2 oracle. Theorem 1 follows from the above strategies.
Conclusion
We give the strongest security model for certificateless encryption and relate it to Type I and Type II adversaries [Den08] . We give the first construction for a strongly secure one round certificateless key agreement scheme that is proven to be secure in the random oracle model, if the computational bilinear Diffie-Hellman and the computational Diffie-Hellman assumptions hold. This enables us to positively answer Swanson's [Swa08, Chapter 7] first question, whether it is even possible to construct a certificateless key agreement scheme that meets the extended eCK model. The protocol is compatible with existing certificateless key infrastructures and can thus be deployed easily. It is furthermore a natural complement to certificateless encryption, which brings us to Swanson's second question: We show that a practical protocol for CL-AKE exists, although it is computationally expensive. We also show how the computational cost can be reduced if we use gap assumptions. We prove our scheme to be more secure than ID-based schemes, in the sense that the KGC can be more actively trying to learn secrets. To answer Swanson's third question, whether the flexibility of certificateless schemes is worth the increased likeliness of vulnerabilities, we note that the ability of the adversary to replace public keys does not necessarily have to introduce vulnerabilites. CL-AKE schemes therefore combine user flexibility with enhanced privacy. It remains to devise computationally more efficient one round protocols for certificateless key agreement proven secure with respect to standard computational problems such as DH or BDH. Furthermore, a proof for a certificateless key agreement scheme in the standard model would be very interesting.
